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Abstract— Humans often assume that robots are rational.
We believe robots take optimal actions given their objective;
hence, when we are uncertain about what the robot’s objective
is, we interpret the robot’s actions as optimal with respect to
our estimate of its objective. This approach makes sense when
robots straightforwardly optimize their objective, and enables
humans to learn what the robot is trying to achieve. However,
our insight is that—when robots are aware that humans learn
by trusting that the robot actions are rational—intelligent robots
do not act as the human expects; instead, they take advantage
of the human’s trust, and exploit this trust to more efficiently
optimize their own objective. In this paper, we formally model
instances of human-robot interaction (HRI) where the human
does not know the robot’s objective using a two-player game.
We formulate different ways in which the robot can model the
uncertain human, and compare solutions of this game when the
robot has conservative, optimistic, rational, and trusting human
models. In an offline linear-quadratic case study and a real-time
user study, we show that trusting human models can naturally
lead to communicative robot behavior, which influences end-
users and increases their involvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
When humans interact with robots, we often assume that
the robot is rational [1]. Imagine a human helping a robot to
set the table. The human end-user has told the robot to bring
two plates from the kitchen; but, when the robot returns, it is
only carrying one. Based on this action—and our assumption
that robots are rational—the end-user learns about the robot’s
objective. For instance, here the human infers that the robot
assigns a high cost to carrying multiple plates at once.
A level of human trust is implicit within this interpretation.
If we assume that the robot takes actions purely to optimize
its objective, we trust that these actions are not meant to
influence the user. In our example, a trusting human does not
realize that the robot may actually be manipulating them into
carrying the second plate. This robot is capable of bringing
two plates, but misleads the human to believe that it can only
carry one in order to reduce its overall effort. Hence, trusting
the robot leads to incorrect human learning: the human does
not learn the robot’s true objective, but instead the objective
the robot has chosen to convey. This behavior is useful for
assistive robots, where humans can become overly reliant on
the robot’s assistance [2], and robots need to make intelligent
decisions that motivate user participation.
Within this work, we study HRI where the human does
not know the robot’s objective. We recognize that:
If the robot is aware of the human’s trust, an optimal robot
should select its actions so as to communicate with the
The authors are with the Stanford Intelligent and Interactive Autonomous
Systems Group (ILIAD), Department of Computer Science, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford, CA 94305. (e-mail: dlosey@stanford.edu)
human and influence their understanding.
Our insight results in autonomous agents that intentionally
communicate with nearby humans as a part of their optimal
behavior. In practice, however, we find that it is not always in
the robot’s best interests to communicate its true objective;
by contrast, misleading actions naturally emerge when robots
model humans as trusting agents. This indicates that—if the
robot has a different objective than the human—user trust
becomes something that the robot can exploit.
Overall, we make the following contributions:
Formulating Human Models. We formulate four ways that
robots can model uncertain humans within a two-player
HRI game. The robot can behave conservatively (as if the
human already knew their objective), optimistically (as if
they can teach the human any objective), model the human
as rational, or treat the human as a trusting agent. Trusting
is a simplification of the rational model: the human learns
while assuming that the robot purely optimizes its objective.
Comparison Between Models. We show that modeling the
human as trusting is not the same as acting optimistically,
but can result in robots that take advantage of the human.
Experiments. To understand the relationship between trust-
ing human models and communicative or influential robot
behavior, we perform an offline linear-quadratic case study
and a real-time user study. Unlike the conservative and
optimistic human models, communicative robot behavior nat-
urally emerges when the robot models the human as trusting,
causing the human participants to adapt their behavior and
increase their overall involvement.
This work is a contribution towards developing communica-
tive robots, and explores the interplay between how humans
model robots and how optimal robots exploit these models.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous research has studied trust during HRI, along
with the robotic and environmental factors that affect the
human’s trust [3]. Autonomous agents can model and infer
the human’s trust based on past interactions [4], and increase
the human’s trust by making the robot’s actions transparent
to explain its decision making process [5]. Most relevant here
is work by Chen et al. [6], who treat the human’s trust as
a latent variable, and integrate trust into the robot’s decision
making. These previous works [3]–[6] consider cases where
the human and collaborative robot share a common objective
and the robot should maximize trust; by contrast, we are
interested in robots that leverage trust to influence users.
Other research focuses on robots that utilize their actions
to implicitly communicate with nearby humans. Communica-
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Fig. 1. Human-robot interaction where the human does not know the robot’s objective, θr . The robot chooses its behavior based on its model of the
human. A conservative robot (Nash) acts as if the human knew θr , while a optimistic robot (Optimistic) thinks that it can teach the human an arbitrary
objective θ˜r . Rather than acting conservatively or optimistically, the robot can treat the human as a rational agent (Bayesian), where the human recognizes
that the robot is aware of their uncertainty b. Because real humans are not completely rational, we propose a simpler alternative (Trusting): here the human
learns about θr from the robot while assuming that the robot behaves conservatively.
tive robot actions facilitate human understanding during the
task [7] so that humans can anticipate what the robot will do
in the future. In order to identify communicative actions, we
need a cognitive model of how the human learns: the human
might respond to the robot’s actions [8], infer the robot’s
objective [9], or follow a personalized learning strategy
[10]. Our research builds upon these prior works [7]–[11]
by identifying communicative actions for a trusting human
model. Unlike research that explicitly generates deceptive
actions [12], here the robot naturally selects misleading
communication. This is similar to learning with opponent-
learning awareness [13]: here only the robot is aware.
We can also frame our work as a contribution to per-
spective taking, where the robot reasons about the human’s
perspective while make decisions [14]–[16]. Prior research in
perspective taking considers which objects are accessible to
the human (i.e., what can the human see or reach), and how
the robot can reduce human confusion or communicate its
intention through proactive, contextual behavior. In our work,
the robot assumes the human has a trusting perspective (or
theory of mind), and solves for optimal responses given this
human perspective.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a human interacting with a robot. The human and
robot each have their own objective, and take actions in order
to achieve that objective. We are interested in settings where
the robot knows both the robot and human objectives, but the
human does not know the robot’s objective. While many prior
works (e.g., imitation learning) focus on expert humans—
who already have access to all the necessary information,
and must teach that information to the robot learner—here
we explore the converse situation.
In this section, we first model human-robot interaction as a
two-player game. Next, we formulate four different strategies
for selecting robot actions, where each strategy is optimal
given the corresponding human model (see Fig. 1). Finally,
we discuss the plate carrying example mentioned in Sec. I
to compare these alternative formulations.
A. Human Robot Interaction as a Two-Player Game
We model human-robot interaction (HRI) as a two-player
Markov game, where both agents affect the state of a dynam-
ical system. Let the system have state x ∈ X , let the robot
take action ur ∈ UR, and let the human take action uh ∈ UH .
The state transitions according to: xt+1 = f(xt, utr, u
t
h),
where f captures the system dynamics. This game starts at
t = 0, and ends after H ∈ Z+ timesteps when t = H .
Rewards. The robot has a reward function: rr(x, ur, uh, θr),
and the human has a reward function: rh(x, ur, uh, θh).
These reward functions are parameterized by the constants
θr and θh, which capture the robot and human objectives,
respectively. Notice that we do not assume that θh = θr ;
hence, the human and robot may have different objectives.
Game. During each timestep the human and robot observe
the current state xt and take simultaneous actions uth and
utr. The robot receives reward rr(x
t, utr, u
t
h, θr) and the
human receives reward rh(xt, utr, u
t
h, θh). Both agents are
attempting to maximize their own sum of rewards over the
finite horizon H . Denote the sequence of robot actions as
ur = {u0r, . . . , uHr } and the sequence of human actions as
uh = {u0h, . . . , uHh }. The sum of rewards for the robot and
human, respectively, are:
Rr(x
0,ur,uh, θr) =
H∑
t=0
rr(x
t, utr, u
t
h, θr) (1)
Rh(x
0,ur,uh, θh) =
H∑
t=0
rh(x
t, utr, u
t
h, θh) (2)
Beliefs over reward functions. The robot knows both θr
and θh, while the human only has access to its own reward
parameters θh. Let D be the probability distribution from
which the parameter θr is sampled; we assume that the
human is aware of this distribution D, and updates their
belief over the robot’s objective based on the robot’s actions.
More specifically, the human has a belief: bt+1(θr) =
P (θr | x0:t, u0:tr , u0:th , θh,D).
B. Formulating Robot’s Responses to Humans
Given our description of HRI as a two-player game, we
want to plan for the robot’s optimal behavior. Importantly, the
robot’s optimal behavior depends on how the robot models
the human. Recall our plate carrying example: if the robot
models the human as a rational agent (where the robot cannot
mislead the user) the robot should bring two plates, but if the
robot models the human as a trusting agent, it should only
bring one. Below we formulate optimal robot behavior in
response to four different human models within the context
of a two-player game.
1) Nash Equilibrium. This robot acts as if the human also
knows θr, so that both the human and robot objectives are
common knowledge. When each agent has all the informa-
tion, their optimal behavior can be computed by finding the
Nash equilibrium of this game. Throughout this work, we
assume that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, and—
if there are multiple equilibria—both agents coordinate to
follow the same one. More formally, (u∗,nr ,u
∗,n
h ) is a strict
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium over the finite horizon H if:
u∗,nr = arg max
ur
Rr
(
x0,ur,u
∗,n
h (θr, θh), θr
)
u∗,nh = arg maxuh
Rh
(
x0,u∗,nr (θr, θh),uh, θh
) (3)
We emphasize that the human and robot policies u∗,nh (θr, θh)
and u∗,nr (θr, θh) can be specified as a function of the reward
parameters θr and θh since these policies are optimizers of
the reward functions (1) and (2).
A robot should follow u∗,nr when the human knows θr.
But, in our setting, the human does not initially know θr ;
hence, we can think of u∗,nr as a conservative robot, which
never tries to exploit the human’s uncertainty.
2) Optimistic Robot. At the other end of the spectrum, the
robot can behave optimistically, and assume that—because
the human does not know the robot’s objective—the robot
can teach the human an arbitrary objective θ˜r :
u∗,sr = arg max
ur
Rr
(
x0,ur,u
∗,s
h (θ˜r, θh), θr
)
u∗,sh = arg maxuh
Rh
(
x0,u∗,nr (θ˜r, θh),uh, θh
) (4)
where the robot picks θ˜r. Comparing (4) to (3), here the
human responds as if the robot’s objective is θ˜r rather than
the true objective θr.
3) Bayesian Game. Instead of acting conservatively or
optimistically, the robot can model the human as a rational
agent, where this human solves the HRI game. Given that the
human has a belief b over the robot’s objective, we formalize
rational human behavior as a Bayesian equilibrium [17]:
u∗,br = arg max
ur
Rr
(
x0,ur,u
∗,b
h (b(θr), θh), θr
)
u∗,bh = arg maxuh
Eθ∼b
[
Rh
(
x0,u∗,br (θ, θh),uh, θh
)] (5)
b updates based on the robot’s actions using Bayesian infer-
ence, i.e., bt+1(θr) = bt(θr) · P (utr | x0:t, u0:tr , u0:th , θh, θr).
Notice that, within a Bayesian game, the human realizes
that (a) the robot knows about its belief b, and (b) the robot
takes actions while considering this belief.
4) Trusting Human. In reality, humans are not completely
rational [18], [19]. Instead of modeling the human as rational,
the robot can leverage a simplified model where the human
is trusting. This trusting human assumes that—even though
they do not know the robot’s reward function—the robot will
act conservatively, as if the human knows θr:
u∗,τr = arg max
ur
Rr
(
x0,ur,u
∗,τ
h (b(θr), θh), θr
)
u∗,τh = arg maxuh
Eθ∼b
[
Rh
(
x0,u∗,nr (θ, θh),uh, θh
)] (6)
Comparing (6) to (5), a trusting human assumes that the
robot follows u∗,nr , while a rational human understands that
the robot reasons over their belief b.
Let us return to our plate carrying example. A rational
human, u∗,bh , recognizes that the robot may be trying to
mislead them, and is therefore always reluctant to carry
a plate. By contrast, a trusting human, u∗,τh , assumes that
the conservative robot will never try to take advantage of
their uncertainty: if the robot only brings a single plate, this
indicates to the trusting human that robot cannot carry more,
and so the user carries a second plate to assist the robot. We
present a more formal description of this example below.
C. Plate Carrying Example
A human and a robot are carrying plates to set the table.
Both agents want more plates to be placed upon the table,
but prefer for the other agent to bring these plates. The
system state in this problem is x, where x ∈ Z+ is the
total number of plates on the table. During every timestep,
the robot and human can each bring up to two new plates:
UR = UH = {0, 1, 2}, and hence the system dynamics are:
xt+1 = xt+utr+u
t
h. We let θr, θh > 0, and define the robot
and human rewards so that θr and θh individually penalize
the robot and human for carrying plates. More specifically,
for each timestep t < H: rr(x, ur, uh, θr) = −θru2r and
rh(x, ur, uh, θh) = −θhu2h. At the final timestep t = H each
agent is rewarded for the total number of plates set on the
table: rH(x) = xH . For simplicity, we constrain this example
problem so that the human and robot cannot carry plates at
the same time. To do this, we added a penalty −α · uruh
to both rr and rh, where α → ∞ makes it prohibitively
expensive for the agents to carry plates simultaneously.
In the next section we list how the robot should optimally
carry plates for different human models.
IV. PLANNING FOR INTERACTION
WITH UNCERTAIN HUMANS
We have introduced four formulations for identifying
robot behavior when the human does not know the robot’s
objective, where each formulation is optimal given a different
human model: conservative, optimistic, rational, and trusting.
Next, we focus on how robots that model humans as trusting
agents compare to these alternative formulations. We first
demonstrate that we can express HRI with a trusting human
as a Markov decision process, and, accordingly, we can
leverage existing techniques to plan for interactions with
trusting humans that do not know θr. We then compare
the trusting human model to Bayesian games using our
plate carrying example, and show that—while responding to
trusting humans is not the same as acting optimistically—an
intelligent robot takes advantage of the human’s trust.
A. Trusting Humans as a Markov Decision Process
Here, we revisit the two-player game outlined in Sec-
tion III-A, and use the trusting human model (6) to refor-
mulate this game as an instance of a single-agent Markov
decision process (MDP). Expressing the trusting human
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF ROBOT INTERACTIONS WITH UNCERTAIN HUMANS UNDER DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS. THE ROBOT AND HUMAN ARE CARRYING
PLATES: ONE INTERESTING CASE OCCURS WHEN θr = 0.2 AND θh = 0.25. HERE A ROBOT INTERACTING WITH A TRUSTING HUMAN ONLY BRINGS A
SINGLE PLATE AT THE FIRST TIMESTEP, INFLUENCING THE HUMAN TO CARRY PLATES DURING THE SECOND TIMESTEP.
Formulation Nash Optimistic Bayesian Trusting Bayesian Trusting
Distribution D − − U(0, 1.5) U(0, 1.5) Boltzmann(a = 0.1) Boltzmann(a = 0.1)
Robot actions at t = 0, 1 2, 2 0, 0 1, 0 1, 0 2, 2 1, 0
Human actions at t = 0, 1 0, 0 2, 2 0, 2 0, 2 0, 0 0, 2
Mean human estimate of θr 0.2 > 1 4/7 2/3 0.22 0.43
Rr , Rh 2.4, 4 4, 2 2.8, 2 2.8, 2 2.4, 4 2.8, 2
model as an MDP enables us to leverage existing methods
to solve for u∗,τr . Our insight is recognizing that—instead of
the state x—this MDP has an augmented state s that captures
the necessary information to model the trusting human.
MDP. Interacting with trusting humans that do not know the
robot’s objective is a finite-horizon MDP defined by the tuple
M = 〈S,UR, T, θr, H〉 [20]. We introduced some of these
terms in Section III-A: UR is the robot’s action space, θr is
the robot’s objective, and H is the finite planning horizon.
State. Define the augmented state s ∈ S to be s = (x, θh, b),
where x is the system state, θh is the human’s objective, and
b is the human’s belief over the robot’s objective.
Prediction. Given st the robot can predict the current human
action uth under the trusting human model. First, using θh,
the robot solves (3) to obtain u∗,nr (θ, θh) for all θr ∈ ΘR.
Next, using bt, xt, u∗,nr (θ, θh), and θh, the robot obtains u
∗,τ
h
with (6). u∗,τh is a sequence; the t-th element of u
∗,τ
h is u
t
h.
Repeating this process at every s yields the human policy.
Transition. The transition function T (st+1 | st, utr) captures
how s evolves over time. We previously defined the system
dynamics as xt+1 = f(xt, utr, u
t
h), θh is a constant, and
b updates based on how the human learns (e.g., Bayesian
inference or gradient descent).
Underactuated Dynamics of Interaction. When uncertain
humans are trusting agents, the interaction between the
human and robot becomes an underactuated system. This
comes from our MDP reformulation: the trusting human
policy is a function of s, and the robot employs its actions
ur to control how s transitions. Consider our plate carrying
example: if the robot brings two plates, the human will carry
no plates, but if the robot brings a single plate, the human
carries the second plate. Hence, the robot uses its own actions
to indirectly control (i.e., influence) the human’s behavior.
B. Comparing Trusting Humans to Other Human Models
Now that we know how to identify optimal behavior
when interacting with trusting humans, we explore how this
behavior compares to interacting under other human models.
Using our plate carrying example, we compute how uncertain
humans and conservative (Nash) or optimistic robots interact,
as well as robots that model the human as completely rational
(Bayesian). By comparing examples of this behavior to our
trusting model, we demonstrate that there are situations
where robots take advantage of the human’s trust.
Computing Solutions. We list the robot and human behavior
for one interesting case of our plate carrying example in
Table I. When θh, θr < 1/3, we conservatively assume that
the agents follow the Nash equilibrium (3) where the robot
carries the plates. For Optimistic (4), the robot chooses θ˜r >
1, so that it always makes sense for the human to carry plates.
We list the Bayesian (5) and Trusting (6) models under
two different distributions D. Intuitively, when θr is sampled
from a uniform distribution the rational human is very
uncertain about the robot’s objective, and so the robot can
induce the human to carry plates. On the other hand, when
θr is sampled from a Boltzmann distribution, the human
is confident that the robot’s objective is low, and thus the
robot becomes unable to mislead this rational human. More
specifically, a rational human recognizes that the Bayesian
robot plays ur = 1 for θr ∈ [1/7, 1] with a uniform prior,
and learns a mean estimate 4/7. A trusting human thinks
the robot only plays ur = 1 for θr ∈ [1/3, 1], and so their
mean estimate becomes 2/3 with a uniform prior. These
computations are similar for the Boltzmann D, but, because
the human is confident that θr < 1/3, playing ur = 1 is not
sufficient to convince a rational human that θr > 1/3.
Analysis. The results from our the plate carrying example
provide a useful comparison between the trusting human
model and our other formulations.
First, we observe that interacting with a trusting human is
not necessarily the same as behaving optimistically. Consider
the example in Table I: while the optimistic robot plans
for the best possible case—where the human carries all
the plates—the robot interacting with a trusting end-user
recognizes that the human’s actions depend on their belief.
This robot reasons about how its behavior influences the
human’s understanding of the robot’s objective: within the
example, the robot initially brings a single plate to convince
the human to carry additional plates at the next timestep.
Second, there are situations where robots interacting with
trusting humans take advantage of that human’s trust. Con-
sider the Boltzmann distribution case in Table I: when
the human trusts the robot, the robot intentionally mis-
leads that human into carrying additional plates, but, when
the human is rational (Bayesian), the robot carries all the
plates. In this case, being trusting leads to less reward for
the human than being rational: Rh(x0,u∗,τr ,u
∗,τ
r , θh) <
Rh(x
0,u∗,br ,u
∗,b
r , θh).
Summary. When comparing robots planning under a trusting
𝜃r𝜃h x ; ur ; uh
x = 0𝜃h𝜃r
Fig. 2. Setup for our case study. The human and robot are pushing a
table with linear dynamics to the goal state (x = 0). Both agents want to
minimize a quadratic cost function that considers (a) error from the goal
and (b) their own effort when pushing the table. The human has a point
estimate θˆr of θr , which the human updates using gradient descent with
learning rate η.
human model to Bayesian games, we found that interacting
with trusting humans is not the same as a robot behaving
optimistically, but it can lead to cases where trusting humans
receive less reward than rational humans.
V. CASE STUDY
To understand how modeling the human as a trusting agent
is related to communicative robot behavior, we performed
a simulated user study. This study focuses on a linear-
quadratic (LQ) problem, where the system dynamics are lin-
ear and the human and robot reward functions are quadratic:
our problem setup is shown in Fig. 2. Here the robot knows
both the human and robot objectives, but the human only has
a point estimate of the robot’s objective. We first considered
humans that learn about the robot’s objective from the robot’s
behavior, and demonstrate how our approach leads to robots
that purposely communicate with and mislead the trusting
human. Next, we added users that did not follow our trusting
human model, and measured performance during interactions
when the trusting human model was inaccurate.
A. Simulation Setup
During each simulation, the human and robot pushed a one
degree-of-freedom mass-damper table towards a goal state.
Let x = [p, v]> ∈ R2 be the position p and velocity v relative
to the goal state, let m be the mass of the table, and let b be
a viscous friction constant. The linear system dynamics are:
xt+1 = Axt +B(utr, u
t
h)
A =
[
1 ∆
0 1− b∆/m
]
, B =
[
0
∆/m
] (7)
where ∆ is the period between t and t+1. The agents wanted
to minimize the distance of table from the goal at timestep
H , while also minimizing their own in-task effort:
Rr(x
0,ur,uh, θr) = −‖xH‖2 − θr ·∆u>r ur (8)
Rh(x
0,ur,uh, θh) = −‖xH‖2 − θh ·∆u>huh (9)
Here θr, θh ∈ R are constants that determine the trade-off
between error and effort. The robot knew θr and θh, while
the human only knew θh and had a point estimate θˆr of
θr. Similar to prior work [21], we assumed that the human
updated their point estimate using gradient descent:
θˆt+1r = θˆ
t
r + η · ∇θ
∣∣u∗,nr (θ, θh)− utr∣∣ (10)
with learning rate η > 0. Thus, the human learned based on
the difference between the predicted robot behavior, u∗,nr ,
and the actual robot action, ur. When both agents know θr
and θh, this HRI problem is an instance of a deterministic
linear-quadratic game [22]. Control strategies that achieve
a Nash equilibrium are of the form utr = −Ktrxt and
uth = −Kthxt, where Kr,Kh ∈ R1×2 are feedback gain
matrices [22], [23]. We note that—within this deterministic
LQ game—a pure Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.
B. Independent Variables
We compared three formulations for selecting robot behav-
ior: conservatively following the Nash equilibrium (Nash),
optimistically solving the two-player game (Optimistic), or
computing optimal behavior for a trusting human (Trust).
For Nash the robot follows (3), for Optimistic the robot
solves (4), and for Trust the robot leverages (6). Each of
these robot strategies makes a different assumption about the
human user: Nash acts as if the human knew θr, Optimistic
assumes the human believes the robot objective is θ˜r, and
Trust simplifies the rational human model.
To assess the performance of these robotic approaches
with different types of users, we also varied the human’s
interaction strategy. There were three types of simulated
users:
• Learn, a trusting end-user that updates its point estimate
θˆr using (10). Within this category we simulated hu-
mans that learn at different rates: η = {0, 2.5, 5, 10, 20}.
• Fixed, an end-user who assumes θˆt+1r = θˆtr, and always
follows the Nash equilibrium for their initial estimate
of θr. We can think of this as an end-user who never
adapts to the robot during HRI. Fixed is the same as
Learn when η = 0, but we use Fixed to test situations
where the robot incorrectly believes η > 0 (e.g., η =
{5, 10, 20}).
• Predict, an end-user who predicts that the next N
robot actions will be the same as utr, and responds
accordingly.
Our simulations explored how Nash, Optimistic, and Trust
interact with these different types of simulated humans.
Implementation Details. Each trial we sampled θr ∼
N (5, 0.5), θh ∼ N (1, 0.5), and θˆ0r ∼ U(0.05, 0.15). We
set the mean value of θr to be higher than θˆ0r to focus on
interesting cases where the human initially believed that the
robot cared less about its effort than it actually did. The
parameters in (7) were m = 0.5 kg, b = 1 N·s/m, ∆ = 0.5
s, x0 = [−1, 0]>, and H = 10 s.
C. Dependent Measures
We report the total cost (i.e., negative reward) of the HRI
task: Robot Cost is −Rr from (8) and Human Cost is −Rh
from (8). We also measure how communicative the robot’s
Nash
Optimistic
Trust
𝜃 r
Fig. 3. Example interaction with a trusting human that learns from robot actions (learning rate η = 5). Left: the position of the table with respect to
the goal. Middle: the robot’s applied force. Right: the human’s estimate θˆr of the robot’s true objective θr . Shaded regions show the standard error of the
mean (SEM) across trials. The Trust robot is aware of the human’s trust, and intentionally moves the table away from the goal at the start of the task in
order to convince the human to complete the rest of the task autonomously. Although Trust applies more total effort than Nash and Optimistic, it ultimately
obtains a higher reward since it quickly convinces the human to take over, and thus completes the task with the least state error. Notice that the human
learned an increased value for θˆr when the robot applied small forces towards the goal (Nash and Optimistic), but pulling the table away from the goal
(Trust) resulted in the largest human estimate θˆr , better misleading the human into believing that the robot was uninterested in the goal.
𝜂 𝜂 𝜂
Fig. 4. Objective performance when interacting with a trusting human during a linear-quadratic game. Left: the cost incurred by the robot. Middle: the
cost incurred by the human. Right: the percentage of robot actions that are communicative. Error bars report the standard error of the mean (SEM). Trust
leads to less robot cost than either Nash or Optimistic, and also reduces the cost for the human agent. Only the Trust robot takes communicative actions,
i.e., actions that move the table away from the goal. Although these actions are locally sub-optimal, they convey the robot’s future behavior to the human,
and improve the overall HRI performance (in terms of cost) for both the robot and human.
actions are: a communicative action is an action that pushes
the table away from the goal. Communication % refers to
the percent of the robot’s total effort ‖ur‖1 that pushes the
table in the opposite direction of the goal.
D. Communicating with Trusting Humans
Figs. 3 and 4 summarize our results when interacting with
Learn humans that trust the robot. Nash and Optimistic robots
always apply positive forces to push the table towards the
goal. By contrast, robots which realize that the human trusts
them (Trust) apply negative forces at the start of the task,
moving the table away from the goal. Although seemingly
counter-productive, these actions signal to the human that the
robot places a high value on its own effort, and increase the
human’s estimate θˆr so that the human exerts more effort to
guide the table towards the goal. Put another way, pulling
the table away from the goal convinces the human to take
over.
Inspecting Fig. 4, we find that the communicative actions
of the Trust robot yield lower robot cost than either Nash
or Optimistic across all tested learning rates η. The com-
munication percent decreases as the human’s learning rate
increases, since fewer negative forces are required to convey
the robot’s reward if the human learns quickly. Interestingly,
Trust also reduced the human cost as compared to Nash and
Optimistic: modeling the human as a trusting agent here led
to improved performance for both the human and robot as
compared to conservative and optimistic models.
Summary. Communicative actions emerged as part of the
optimal response when interacting with a trusting human;
the Trust robot intentionally signaled this human by moving
away from the goal, resulting in lower overall costs.
E. Human Model Errors
So far we have focused on trusting humans that learn
from robot actions. In Fig. 5, however, we simulate users
that diverge from this trusting model. If the robot assumes
that the human learns—but the human does not—then Trust
can be outperformed by Optimistic and Nash. We find that
Trust becomes more robust to human model errors when the
robot assumes higher values of η, or, put another way, when
the robot takes fewer communicative actions. This matches
with our intuition: if the robot pushes the table away from
the goal to communicate their objective, but the human does
not learn from this action, then the robot’s communication is
inefficient and costly. Hence, when the robot is unsure about
the human’s trust, the robot should start by assuming a high
learning rate η to reduce the amount of communication.
VI. USER STUDY
To test how robots that model uncertain humans as trusting
agents interact with actual human end-users, we conducted a
user study. Our participants worked with a robot to balance
a simulated inverted pendulum (see Fig. 6). We compared
𝜂 = 10 NashOpt. 𝜂 = 5 𝜂 = 20 𝜂 = 10 NashOpt. 𝜂 = 5 𝜂 = 20
Robot Human
Fig. 5. Cost when interacting with non-trusting humans that instead follow
our Fixed or Predict models. Opt is short for optimistic. The Trust robot
incorrectly assumes that the human learns with η = {5, 10, 20}. Higher
assumed learning rates η mitigate errors in the trusting model, since the
robot thinks the human learns faster and takes fewer communicative actions.
two different interaction strategies for the robot: computing
the Nash equilibrium, where the conservative robot assisted
at every timestep to balance the inverted pendulum, and our
trusting model, where the robot occasionally unbalanced the
pendulum to convince the human to take over. Both the
participant and robot wanted to keep the pendulum upright;
however, the robot is also rewarded for maximizing end-user
involvement, so that the human balances the pendulum. We
hypothesized that a robot which reasons over human trust
will increase user involvement during collaborative tasks.
Independent and Dependent Variables. We varied the
robot interaction strategy with two levels: a conservative
Nash strategy, which was based on the Nash equilibrium
formulation (3), and a communicative Trust strategy, which
was inspired by our trusting model (6). Let φ be the angle
of the pendulum from vertical; then, ur = −sign(φ) for the
Nash strategy. Under the Trust strategy, ur = sign(φ) at the
start of the task to intentionally unbalance the pendulum.
For each interaction strategy we measured the normalized
Time Upright and Human Effort. Time upright is the number
of timesteps the pendulum remained vertical, i.e., |φ| < pi/2.
Human effort is defined as the percentage of timesteps that
the participant applied inputs to control the cart. Besides
these objective measures, we also recorded the participants’
subjective responses to a 7-point Likert scale survey.
Experimental Procedure. Our participants consisted of 10
volunteers (3 female, 7 male), with ages ranging from 18−29
years. Participants used a keyboard to control the 1-DoF cart
in the CartPole environment (OpenAI Gym). After a familiar-
ization phase—where the participant interacted without any
robot intervention—users completed five trials with the Nash
robot strategy and five trials with the Trust robot strategy. We
counterbalanced the order of the robot strategies, so that half
of the participants interacted with the Trust robot first.
Results. The results of our user study are summarized in
Fig. 7 and Table II. To interpret our objective results we
performed paired t-tests with robot strategy as the within-
subjects factor. We found a statistically significant difference
between Nash and Trust for time upright (t(9) = 3.1,
p < .05), as well as for human effort (t(9) = 4.8,
p < .001). The communicative actions taken by the Trust
robot (intentionally unbalancing the pendulum) led to greater
human involvement.
Fig. 6. Setup for our user study. Participants used a keyboard (1) to control
a inverted pendulum (2, right). A virtual robot also applied forces to control
this pendulum; when the human stopped providing inputs, the robot was in
charge of keeping the pendulum upright. Robots using our trusting human
model intentionally unbalanced the pendulum to increase user involvement.
Nash Trust Nash Trust
**
Fig. 7. Objective results from our user study. Left: percentage of time the
pendulum was upright. Right: percentage of time the human was involved in
controlling the pendulum. Error bars show SEM, and an ∗ denotes statistical
significance (p < .05). The task was more challenging when the robot
modeled the human as trusting (as evidenced by the lower time upright),
but the user became more involved, and interacted for a longer duration.
We grouped our survey questions into three topics: under-
standing, objectives, and adaptation. Paired t-tests revealed
that there was not a statistically significant difference in
how well participants understood Nash and Trust (t(19) =
0.9, p = .38). Despite this confidence, users incorrectly
believed that Trust did not want to keep the pendulum upright
(t(19) = 4.5, p =< .01). Users also reported that they
adapted their approach more when interacting with Trust
(t(19) = 3.0, p =< .01). Taken together, these responses
suggest that Trust successfully mislead users: by unbalancing
the pendulum, the robot convinced participants that it had a
different objective, and caused users to adjust their behavior.
VII. DISCUSSION
Summary. We focused on partial information settings where
the robot knows both the human’s objective and its own,
while the human only knows their own objective. The robot’s
behavior within these settings depends on how it models the
human. We formulated four different models for two-player
HRI games: the robot can behave conservatively (as if the
human knew their objective), optimistically (as if they can
teach the human any objective), model the human as rational,
or treat the human as a trusting agent. This trusting model
is a simplification of the rational model, where the human
learns while assuming that the robot behaves conservatively.
Comparing our trusting human model to the alternatives,
we found that modeling the human as trusting is not the
same as acting optimistically, but can result in robots that
take advantage of the human’s trust. In a linear-quadratic
case study robots with a trusting human model intentionally
TABLE II
RESULTS OF OUR 7-POINT LIKERT SCALE SURVEY. THE QUESTIONS
WERE GROUPED BY UNDERSTANDING, OBJECTIVES, AND ADAPTATION.
HIGHER VALUES INDICATE AGREEMENT WITH THE POSITIVE
STATEMENT.
Questions Nash Trust p-value
+ I could tell what the robot
5.45 5.05 0.38wanted to achieve− I did not understand the
robot’s objective
+ The robot’s goal was to keep
5.60 3.45 < .001∗the pendulum upright− The robot had a different
objective than I did
+ I adapted over time to
3.75 5.1 < .01∗the robot’s actions− I used the same strategy
across trials
performed locally sub-optimal actions (moving away from
the goal) to convince the human to take over. During our
user study, robots with the trusting human model similarly
convinced humans that the robot did not share their objective,
resulting in adaptation and increased user involvement.
Why Trusting Models? Programming robots to model
humans as trusting agents has benefits as a way to generate
communicative actions and increase user involvement. Under
the trusting model, communicative actions naturally emerge
as part of the solution to an MDP, and do not need to be
explicitly encoded or rewarded. Our case and user studies
suggest that these actions increase user involvement, which
can be particularly useful for assistive robotics and reha-
bilitation applications, where over-assistance is a common
problem [2]. We think robots that are aware of the human’s
trust can make intelligent decisions to avoid behaviors such
as over-assistance.
Limitations and Future Work. Our work is a first step
towards developing influential and communicative robot be-
havior in settings where the human is uncertain. We have so
far assumed that the human and robot coordinate to follow
the same Nash equilibrium; in general, this is not the case,
and so complete solutions must also account for strategy
uncertainty. We also recognize that computing the Nash equi-
libria to these two-player games with high-dimensional states
and actions can quickly become computationally infeasible.
These limitations suggest that—in order to implement
our trust model in realistic settings—we need to identify
suitable, real-time approximations. Our future work focuses
on this challenge: we plan to bias the human model towards
trusting but myopic human behavior, which we can obtain
tractably without identifying Nash equilibria. Equipped with
this approximation, we will pursue realistic applications such
as shared control and assistive robotics.
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